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introduCtion
International neWs coverage oF Mexico FocUses ever More FreQUently on the actions of drug traffickers, reporting shootouts between government forces and criminals in the 
Mexican government’s war against organized crime. Such a pic-
ture, however, conceals many of the true dimensions and victims 
of Mexico’s violent war. In reality, the government carries out 
its war on crime through an array of human rights abuses whose 
victims range from detained suspects, innocent and guilty alike, 
to individuals and communities with no connection to crime.
This article, which forms part one of a two-part series exam-
ining Mexico’s public security policies from a human rights 
perspective and presents an overview of some of the human 
rights violations that characterize Mexico’s security operations 
today.1
Context: the MiLitarization of  
pubLiC seCurity in MexiCo
In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón began his 
administration by launching large-scale militarized crime-fight-
ing operations in Mexican states including Sinaloa, Durango, 
Sonora, Michoacán, Baja California, and Guerrero. These 
operations, portrayed as a necessary response to drug-related 
violence, have deployed military and federal police agents 
in checkpoints on highways and roads, as well as involving 
searches of homes, sweeps of neighborhoods, and the detention 
of countless individuals. To carry out these operations, soldiers 
perform numerous public security tasks that legally fall within 
the competence of the civilian police or public prosecutors. An 
average of 45,000 soldiers now participate monthly in such 
operations,2 with the Department of Public Security declaring in 
2008 that it was going “all-out” to step up its “direct fight” and 
“frontal combat” against criminals.3
Despite these highly visible militarized security operations, 
the number of killings associated with organized drug crime 
in Mexico has more than tripled over the past three years, 
going from over 1,500 in 20054 to over 5,500 in 2008.5 These 
data highlight the ineffectiveness of the militarized frontal 
combat approach to drug trafficking. Indeed, the frontal com-
bat approach, by reducing the concept of public security to a 
territorial war against criminals, fails to address the factors 
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that drive insecurity, including not only endemic flaws in law 
enforcement practices but also extreme disparities in access 
to resources and quality work and educational opportunities. 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Calderón administration 
continued to increase its reliance on frontal combat security 
policies in 2008, announcing the deployment of more soldiers 
to existing and new operations in states such as Chihuahua, 
Oaxaca, Chiapas, Coahuila, Sonora, Tabasco, and Campeche,6 
as well as promoting harsh criminal justice reforms, including 
provisions that violate basic standards of due process.
unMasking MexiCo’s drug war: grave  
vioLations to fundaMentaL rights
The participation of the armed forces in civilian policing 
tasks and the general intensification of Mexico’s war on crime 
under the Calderón administration have led to a growing inci-
dence of serious human rights violations. Over the past two years 
these have included dozens of arbitrary executions (including 
numerous cases in which soldiers have shot and killed civilians 
attempting to drive through military checkpoints), a significant 
number of rapes, frequent arbitrary detentions, routine warrant-
less searches of homes, and the widespread use of torture. The 
number of reports alleging human rights violations by Mexico’s 
Department of Defense (army and air force) received by the 
National Human Rights Commission more than sextupled dur-
ing the first two years of the Calderón administration, going 
from 182 in 20067 to 1,230 in 2008, causing the Department of 
Defense to become the government agency against whom more 
violations are alleged than any other agency.8
As another indicator, national media articles from January 

















Federal soldiers during a door-to-door house search in Culiacán, 
Sinaloa State, Mexico.
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or generalized situations of human rights violations by the 
military, which included shootings, torture, illegal searches, and 
aggression against vulnerable populations such as indigenous 
communities and migrants.9 In the case of Chihuahua State, 
for example, between April and November 2008 alone (that is, 
after the implementation of the militarized security operation 
Joint Operation Chihuahua), the state witnessed at least thirteen 
cases of military abuses reported in the media.10 According to 
the National Human Rights Commission, torture and arbitrary 
detention have been among the most frequent violations, and 
in the case of persons detained in military bases, “the victims 
are interrogated by military personnel who extract information 
through torture: beatings, electric shocks, submersion in water, 
placing plastic bags over their heads. . . .”11
The dramatic surge in reported military human rights viola-
tions following the implementation of militarized anti-crime 
operations is not a phenomenon explained by the wayward 
actions of a few isolated individuals or regiments. Instead, it 
is a direct consequence of using the military for policing tasks 
that is both widespread (having been reported in the majority 
of Mexico’s 32 states) and systematic. Among other factors, 
since soldiers are trained for war, members of the armed forces 
often react with the mentality that they are involved in a war 
against enemy combatants, leading to the excessive use of force. 
Another structural factor perpetuating systematic military abuses 
is the historic impunity for these abuses that stems largely from 
the use of military jurisdiction to investigate such crimes, to be 
discussed further below.
Illustrative examples of specific military human rights viola-
tions committed under the current administration include the 
case of four civilians shot and killed by soldiers on the evening 
of March 26, 2008 on a road in the state of Sinaloa. The vic-
tims were not armed, nor is there any evidence that they were 
participating in any crime. Another example from Sinaloa state 
occurred when soldiers shot and killed five family members at 
a military checkpoint in La Joya, Sinaloa, on June 1, 2007. In 
this case, soldiers opened fire on eight members of the Esparza 
Galaviz family. Five of the family members, all women and 
children, died in this attack, while the other three (including two 
more children) sustained injuries.12 This is one of more than 
seventeen cases of violations committed at a military checkpoint 
reported since January 2007.13 Other arbitrary executions have 
included the shooting of two campesinos in Lachivía, Oaxaca, 
in August 200814 and the shooting of 16-year-old Iván Calderón 
in front of a military camp in Morelia, Michoacán, on May 12, 
2008.15 There is no indication that any of these victims was 
engaged in illegal activities of any kind.
Other types of human rights violations that characterize the 
crime war are exemplified by the generalized abuses that took 
place in Carácuaro, Nocupétaro, and Huetamo, in the state of 
Michoacán, during the first week of May 2007. Following an 
ambush in which several soldiers were killed by criminals, the 
army initiated a search for the perpetrators that quickly turned 
into an excuse for indiscriminate repression against the region’s 
population. More than 1,000 soldiers maintained the area under 
a virtual siege for three days, while the mayors of Carácuaro and 
Nocupétaro reported “countless” cases of torture and warrant-
less searches of homes.16 Several residents who attempted to file 
reports of human rights abuses with the state human rights com-
mission were prevented from doing so, beaten, and threatened 
in retaliation.17 Soldiers also sexually abused four minor girls in 
Nocupétaro, Michoacán. After interrogating the girls about drug 
cartel activity in the area, beating them, and threatening to kill 
them, soldiers took the victims to a military base and sexually 
assaulted them.18 The National Human Rights Commission, 
which documented the case, later verified that two of the girls 
had been raped.19
It is also worth noting the pattern of attacks and threats 
against journalists who attempt to cover police and military 
operations. A paradigmatic example of abuses in this category 
include attacks and threats by soldiers against journalist Emilio 
Gutiérrez Soto and his family in Chihuahua in May 2008, which 
forced him to flee the country and seek asylum in the United 
States.20
Finally, the war on crime lends itself to the existing tendency 
toward criminalization of social protest and the persecution of 
social movements by Mexican state authorities, producing a 
high number of unjustified detentions of social activists who 
are accused of some form of criminal activity. Authorities make 
use of the war on drug trafficking as a pretext for the repres-
sion of indigenous communities, whose leaders may be accused 
of organized crime.21 Meanwhile, in states such as Chiapas 
“Indeed, the frontal combat approach, by reducing the 
concept of public security to a territorial war against 
criminals, fails to address the factors that drive insecurity, 
including not only endemic flaws in law enforcement 
practices but also extreme disparities in access to resources 
and quality work and educational opportunities.”
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migrants are robbed and attacked by state authorities who some-
times cite the need to search for arms and drugs.22
entrenChed iMpunity and the iLLegaL extension  
of MiLitary JurisdiCtion
A key factor facilitating the human rights abuses highlighted 
above is Mexico’s environment of entrenched impunity for 
human rights violations. Indeed, unlike other Latin American 
countries, where years of struggle have led to trials and convic-
tions for many human rights violators from the era of military 
dictatorships, Mexico has not held accountable any perpetrators 
of its own Dirty War of the late 1960s through the early 1980s.23 
The absence of such accountability has set the stage for contin-
ued impunity for violations today.  
In the sphere of military human rights violations, Mexico’s 
continued use of military jurisdiction to investigate human rights 
crimes helps to maintain impunity. Article 13 of the Mexican 
Constitution establishes that “military jurisdiction subsists for 
crimes and offenses against military discipline. . .”24 However, 
“military discipline” is defined by the army, in Article 57 of its 
Code of Military Justice, in an expansive manner that includes 
even crimes committed by military personnel that violate civil-
ians’ basic human rights.25 These crimes are thus investigated 
and tried by military authorities who lack impartiality and inde-
pendence from the agents they are charged with investigating. 
Numerous international human rights bodies have explained 
that Mexico’s use of military jurisdiction to investigate and try 
human rights cases is not permissible under international law 
and prevents accountability for violations. Former UN Special 
Rapporteur on Torture Sir Nigel Rodley reported after a visit to 
Mexico, “Military personnel appear to be immune from civilian 
justice and generally protected by military justice,”26 and speci-
fied, “[c]ases of serious crimes committed by military person-
nel against civilians [should] be subject to civilian justice.”27 
Similar calls have been issued to the Mexican government by 
the UN Committee Against Torture, the Special Rapporteur on 
Violence against Women, the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial 
Executions, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers, and the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention.28 It is also worth noting the constant jurisprudence of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which establishes 
that military jurisdiction “is not the competent jurisdiction to 
investigate and, if applicable, prosecute and punish the perpetra-
tors of human rights violations.”29 At the end of 2008, however, 
Mexican authorities continued to apply military jurisdiction to 
cases of human rights abuses in violation of the Constitution and 
the international standards listed above.
vioLations in MexiCo’s CriMinaL  
JustiCe systeM
Military abuses are far from the only type of violation that 
characterizes Mexico’s war on crime. Rather, for individu-
als arrested by police in Mexico, human rights violations are 
systematic and widespread at both the state and federal level. 
Among subjects of great concern in this regard are the viola-
tion of the rights to personal liberty, due process, and physical 
integrity.
Torture in particular continues to be a hallmark of Mexican 
police work. Researchers for Mexico’s National Human Rights 
Center have concluded that roughly two-thirds of Mexico’s 
investigatory police rely on torture to obtain information from 
detainees.30 Here too, entrenched impunity perpetuates viola-
tions. Although more than one out of five of the recommenda-
tions issued by Mexico City’s Human Rights Commission over 
its fifteen-year period of operations have been for cases of torture 
committed by city authorities, with city prosecutors opening 197 
investigations based on complaints of torture from July 2005 to 
July 2008, none has led to the conviction of those responsible.31 
In Jalisco, despite the enactment fourteen years ago of a law 
against torture, no official has yet been convicted of this crime.32 
In the major city of Monterrey, Nuevo León, the ten-year-old 
law against torture has led to just one conviction.33
“The dramatic surge in 
reported military human 
rights violations following 
the implementation of 
militarized anti-crime 
operations is not a 
phenomenon explained by 
the wayward actions of a 
few isolated individuals or 
regiments. Instead, it is a 
direct consequence of using 
the military for policing 
tasks that is both widespread 
. . . and systematic.”
In light of the dysfunctional model by which Mexico’s 
criminal justice system has long functioned—one that too 
often convicts defendants based on confessions extracted under 
torture, which in many cases are not true—the comprehensive 
reform of the criminal justice system has been one of the long-
standing demands of the Mexican human rights movement. 
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Unfortunately, Felipe Calderón’s 2007 proposals for criminal 
justice reform made clear that respect for human rights was not 
the defining factor in his plan. The modified version of his pro-
posed reform package that eventually became law and reformed 
the Mexican Constitution in June 2008 contained some essential 
advances, but also serious setbacks for human rights, publicized 
by the government as necessary measures in the war on crime.
Among the advances contained in the recent criminal justice 
reforms, the most notable is the adoption of an adversarial, 
oral criminal justice system. Following years of advocacy by 
civil society, academics, and experts in this field, Article 20 
of Mexico’s Constitution now explicitly establishes a criminal 
justice system based on oral trials for criminal defendants, to be 
implemented gradually over the next seven years.
Among the setbacks contained in the same criminal justice 
reform is the elevation to Constitutional status of arraigo. 
Arraigo is a type of detention, already common in Mexico, in 
which prosecutors may detain individuals for months prior to 
charging them with any crime. This logic of ‘detain first and 
investigate later’ has naturally encouraged the use of torture 
during the period of arraigo to produce leads regarding the 
possible participation of the detainee or others in crimes. In 
cases of suspected organized crime, Article 16 of Mexico’s 
Constitution now provides that prosecutors may place individu-
als under arraigo for up to eighty days.34 This prolonged period 
of detention without charge violates the right to liberty estab-
lished in the American Convention on Human Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As Human 
Rights Watch has pointed out, the eighty-day period of pre-
charge detention now authorized in the Mexican Constitution is 
also “the longest of its kind in any Western democracy. In other 
countries, the limit for any form of pre-charge detention. . . is 
generally less than seven days.”35 
The same set of criminal justice reforms also incorporated 
into the Constitution a special “regime” of exceptional measures 
for individuals accused of involvement in organized crime, 
which restricts due process rights and applies starting from the 
phase of investigation. This special regime of exception allows 
for intrusive and human rights-violating measures (such as 
arraigo and relaxed evidentiary standards) that undermine basic 
due process guarantees to the detriment of those investigated, 
charged, or sentenced within its framework. 
By establishing two separate justice systems in the Mexican 
Constitution—one for organized crime and another for common 
crimes—the reforms in effect translate into one criminal justice 
system for those seen as citizens and another for those seen as 
enemies of the State. They divide Mexican society into those 
who possess human rights, on one hand, and those who are seen 
as enemies first and human beings second.
eneMies of the state: governMentaL disCourse  
in the war on CriMe
The government has frequently sought to justify its actions in 
the war on crime, including human rights violations, by portray-
ing human rights as irrelevant ideals or as an obstacle to fight-
ing criminals. The former head of Mexico’s Special Office for 
the Investigation of Organized Crime argued that the criminal 
justice reforms discussed immediately above were necessary 
to fight crime because “[w]e do not live in an ideal country fit 
for the application of ideal laws, we live in a country in con-
flict. . .”36 For those who might still have qualms over the annul-
ment or violation of their human rights, the Calderón admin-
istration has made clear that persons suspected of organized 
criminal activities (portrayed in official discourse as the only 
population affected negatively by the authorities’ war against 
crime) are not normal citizens in any case, but rather enemies 
of the State: “in this war against crime, against the enemies of 
Mexico, there will be no truce made nor quarter given.”37 This 
dehumanizing mentality is also apparent among members of 
the security forces, such as one high-profile army general who 
summarized the results of a shoot-out in which he reported that 
fourteen individuals had been killed by stating simply, “[now] 
there are fourteen fewer criminals.”38 
In recent months, the government has moved beyond a mere 
false dichotomy between human rights and public security, and 
has sought to appropriate human rights discourse to portray 
the government’s drug war as affirmatively in favor of human 
rights. In December 2008, Calderón explained during a cer-
emony to present the National Human Rights Award:
“. . . the principal human rights challenge facing 
Mexico today comes from the unpunished action of 
crime . . . if we are to transform Mexico into a coun-
try characterized by the rule of law and human rights, 
where the latter are fully respected, it is clear that the 
public and governmental authorities must join forces 
[against] this principal challenge of Mexican society.
. . . 
This is the reason for the [militarized public security] 
operations, in which we strengthen the power of the 
State in regions that are dominated by the unpunished 
action of crime.”39
This argument pays lip service to human rights as a concept, 
yet seeks to divert attention from government authorities’ failure 
to respect a broad spectrum of human rights by convincing the 
public that organized criminals, the enemies of the State, are the 
real source of human rights violations.40 In this way, the govern-
ment seeks to neutralize one of the human rights movement’s 
most powerful tools—the moral capital of the words ‘human 
rights’—by turning it into a weapon in its own arsenal as it 
wages the drug war.
ConCLusion
Rather than a just war against enemies of the State, Mexico’s 
war on crime frequently takes the form of an assault against 
civilians who are arbitrarily detained, tortured, or even killed 
within its framework. As has historically been the case in 
Mexico’s criminal justice system, these and other violations 
often fall disproportionately on members of marginalized social 
groups, who may or may not have any connection to crime.
As Mexico seeks to reverse the dramatic rise in drug-related 
crime seen over the past few years, it is necessary to reorient the 
criminal justice system to embody the positive aspects of recent 
legal reforms, while taking decisive action to eliminate policies 
and practices that violate human rights. In light of the wide-
spread human rights violations committed by the military, in a 
strategy of force that has not reduced overall levels of criminal 
violence, the government must withdraw the armed forces from 
the streets and recognize that law enforcement duties require 
the action of an effective, professionalized police structure act-
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oral criminal trials established in the Constitution as soon as 
practicable, observing the prohibition on the use of testimony 
obtained through torture and consequently catalyzing improve-
ments in police investigatory practices. Another concrete step 
urgently needed in the current context is the prosecution—in 
civilian jurisdiction—of state security agents who commit tor-
ture and other human rights violations, ending the current cycle 
of impunity. Such measures would in turn increase public trust 
in police, as would the existence of effective police oversight 
mechanisms and the recruitment and training of a better-paid 
and better-educated police force. In a country in which under-
reporting of crimes to the authorities is the leading cause of 
impunity for criminals, the advantages of these steps for human 
rights and security alike are clear.
Simultaneous actions to eliminate structural causes of inse-
curity, such as those aimed at reducing poverty and vast dis-
parities in access to government services, are crucial. Such 
measures, sometimes erroneously dismissed as idealistic plans 
that must wait until the crime problem is solved, are instead 
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In short, as photos and headlines continue to bring news of 
Mexico’s crime war to the international community, it is increas-
ingly crucial to recall that reducing criminal violence is a goal 
that neither justifies nor, evidently, is advanced by unleashing a 
systematic war on the human rights of Mexico’s population.
HRB
12
20 See, e.g., Rubén Villalpando y Julia Antonieta Le Duc, Periodista 
pide asilo en EU por acoso de militares, la Jornada, June 20, 
2008, available at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/06/20/index. 
php?section=politica&article=020n2pol.
21 Such repression includes the persecution of social leaders and 
community members, who may be searched, threatened, or detained 
under the pretext of possessing arms or being otherwise connected 
to crime. See, e.g., Hermann Bellinghausen, Acciones intimida-
torias del Ejército contra comunidad zapoteca en Oaxaca, la 
Jornada, June 28, 2007, available at http://www.jornada.unam.
mx/2007/06/28/index.php?section=politica&article=016n1pol; 
Ángeles Mariscal, Incursión militar en Chiapas, la Jornada, Sept. 
1, 2007, available at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2007/09/01/
index.php?section=politica&article=012n3pol.
22 See María de Jesus Peters, Militares cobran entrada al país a 
indocumentados, dicen en Chiapas, el Universal, April 14, 2007. 
23 Although of a smaller numerical scale than the Dirty Wars 
of the Southern Cone, this period of state-sponsored repression 
included the use of forced disappearance (which claimed hundreds 
and perhaps more than 1,000 victims) and several high-profile 
massacres. See Esclarecimiento y sanción a los delitos del pasado 
durante el sexenio 2000-2006: Compromisos quebrantados y 
justicia aplazada, 2006 (book by a coalition of seven Mexican 
NGOs and a national network of human rights organizations, on file 
with author), pp. 9-10, 50.
24 Author’s translation.
25 Earlier this year, Center Prodh filed two amparos (legal actions 
designed to protect an individual against illegal governmental 
conduct) challenging the constitutionality of Mexico’s Code of 
Military Justice insofar as it extends military jurisdiction over 
cases of human rights violations. These legal actions come in the 
context of the military’s arbitrary shooting of six individuals in 
the community of Santiago de Caballeros, Sinaloa, in March 2008, 
resulting in the deaths of four of the victims. Following the initial 
denial of the amparo actions, we and several of the victims’ family 
members appealed and asked Mexico’s Supreme Court to hear the 
case, which would give the Court the opportunity to declare that the 
use of military jurisdiction to investigate and judge human rights 
violations is unconstitutional.
26 Report of the Special Rapporteur, ¶ 86, E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.2 
(Jan. 14, 1998) (prepared by Mr. Nigel Rodley).
27 Id. at ¶ 88j.
28 See Committee Against Torture [CAT], Concluding 
Observations, ¶ 14, CAT/C/MEX/CO/4 (Feb. 6, 2007); Committee 
Against Torture, Report on Mexico Produced by the Committee 
Under Article 20 of the Convention, ¶ 220g, CAT/C/75 (May 
25, 2003); Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against 
women, its causes and consequences, ¶ 69a(vi), E/CN.4/2006/61/
Add.4 (Jan. 13, 2006) (prepared by Yakin Ertürk); Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms of indigenous people, ¶ 90, E/CN.4/2004/80/Add.2 
(Dec. 23, 2003) (prepared by Rodolfo Stavenhagen,); Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary execu-
tions, ¶ 107f, E/CN.4/2000/3/Add.3 (Nov. 25, 1999) (prepared by 
Asma Jahangir); Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independ-
ence of judges and lawyers, ¶ 192d, E/CN.4/2002/72/Add.1 (Jan. 
24, 2002) (prepared by Dato’Param Cumaraswamy); Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention on its Visit to Mexico, ¶ 72f, E/CN.4/2003/8/
Add.3 (Dec. 17, 2002). 
29 Zambrano Vélez v. Ecuador, 2007 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 166, at 19 (July 4, 2007). 
30 Georgina Pineda, Dos de cada tres judiciales torturan para 
investigar, Milenio, Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.milenio.
com/node/132062. The Committee Against Torture found in 2003 
that torture remains a systematic practice in Mexico, saying “torture 
continues to be practised frequently in Mexico. . . the widespread 
absence of penalties, whether administrative or criminal, for those 
responsible [is a contributing factor].” See Committee Against 
Torture [CAT], Report on Mexico Produced by the Committee 
Under Article 20 of the Convention, ¶ 137-38 CAT/C/75 (May 25, 
2003). 
31 See David Saúl Vela & Georgina Pineda, Por tortura, una 
de cada 5 recomendaciones en el DF, Milenio, Dec. 16, 2008, 
available at http://impreso.milenio.com/node/8509865.
32 Organizaciones Civiles de Derechos Humanos, Boletín de prensa: 
Visita del Subcomité para la Prevención de la Tortura a México, 
Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://www.cencos.org/es/node/19396. 
33 Id.
34 The initial limit established in Article 16 is forty days, after 
which the period of arraigo may be extended up to eighty days.
35 Letter from José Miguel Vivanco, Executive Director, 
Americas Division, Human Rights Watch, to President Felipe 
Calderón (March 6, 2008) available at http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2008/03/06/mexico18221_txt.htm.
36 Ignacio Ilzaga, Es rosa, no draconiana, la reforma de justicia: 
PGR, Milenio, Feb. 18, 2008, available at http://www.milenio.
com/monterrey/milenio/notaanterior.asp?id=923194. Author’s 
translation.
37 Presidencia de la República, En la guerra contra la delincuencia 
no habrá tregua ni cuartel: Presidente Felipe Calderón, 
Sept. 12, 2008, available at http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/
prensa/?contenido =38611. Referring to the violent character of 
the government’s war on crime, Calderón has stated in numerous 
speeches, “If you see dust flying, don’t worry, it’s because we’re 
cleaning the house.” See Sergio Javier Jiménez, Calderón exalta 
lucha anticrimen, el Universal, Feb. 15, 2008, available at  
http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/157584.html. Author’s 
translation. See also Office of the President, Conferencia Magistral 
del Presidente Calderón en la Universidad de Harvard (translation 
of speech), Feb. 11, 2008, available at http://www.presidencia.gob.
mx/prensa/?contenido=33742.
38 La CNDH debería hacer recomendaciones a los cárteles,  
dice general en Chihuahua, la Jornada, Apr. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2008/04/08/index.php?section= 
politica&article=010n1pol. Author’s translation.
39 President Felipe Calderón, Discurso en la Entrega del Premio 
Nacional de Derechos Humanos 2008 (Dec. 11, 2008) available at 
http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/prensa/?contenido=40826.  
Author’s translation.
40 See Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center, Sistema 
integral de información en derechos humanos (Sididh), Principal 
reto en DH “acción impune de la delincuencia”: Calderón,  
Dec. 12, 2008, available at http://sididh.wordpress.com/.
